Published on
November 19, 2010 in
Events.
Title: Inferentialism as an Alternative to Modesty
Speaker: Jason White
Date, Time: 23/11/10, 3:00pm
Location: Old Quad moot court, Philosophy Department
Abstract: It is a condition of adequacy for his inferentialist project, acknowledged by Brandom, that it be able to address the paradox which emerges from Wittgenstein’s reflections on rule-following in the Philosophical Investigations. Brandom also claims to overcome what he regards as a ground for rejecting community-oriented accounts of normativity such as those proposed by Wright and Kripke.
I shall offer an exposition of Brandom’s solution to these difficulties, which raises questions regarding the rational constraint that the world imposes upon discursive scorekeeping practice as he conceives it. Greater clarity concerning Brandom’s epistemological position can be obtained in the course of answering a seemingly unrelated question, namely that of whether his inferentialist theory of meaning can constitute a full-blooded semantic programme in Dummett’s sense of the term. McDowell’s objection to Brandom’s epistemological externalism is then considered, and the discussion concludes with reflections on the extent to which inferentialism can address difficulties raised by Dummett with respect to the limits of realism.
Published on
November 16, 2010 in
Events.
Title: BEING HUMAN KIPPLE: a quintessence of dust
Speaker: Ross Barham
Date, Time: 16/11/10, 6:15pm
Location: Old Quadrangle Common Room
Abstract: Together, the film, Blade Runner, and the novel, Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?, address one of the great philosophical problems: what makes us human? Blade Runner systematically rejects most of the usual contenders, such as intelligence, morality, creativity, and sexuality. But it leaves us with only a hint of what the answer actually might be. Do Androids Dream tries to provide that answer. It suggests that the concept of a human being is a morally significant one. And, against the backdrop of a universe in decay, it argues that there is something unique about how we stand in relation to Being that defines us as human. Drawing on philosophical works such as Raimond Gaita’s A Common Humanity, and Martin Heidegger’s Question Concerning Technology, Phillip K Dick’s response to the issue of what it is to be human will be shown to be both profoundly moral and deeply existential.
Published on
November 9, 2010 in
Events.
Title: Embodied Coping and the Conceptuality Experience
Speaker: Lyndal Grant
Date, Time: 09/11/10, 6:15pm
Location: Old Quadrangle Common Room
Abstract: Much of human life is characterised by a kind of thoughtless, skilful engagement with our environment that Hubert Dreyfus, following Merleau-Ponty, has called “embodied coping”. This skilled, embodied coping, whether it be sinking a putt in golf, tying your shoelaces or moving your knight to bring your opponent into check, is a bodily achievement that actually requires that the agent not engage in explicit, deliberative thought. Hubert Dreyfus takes this phenomenon, which has also become known as “flow”, to support the claim that perceptual experience is nonconceptual.
In my paper I will argue that embodied coping does not provide a counter-example to conceptualism about experience. My central claim, also articulated by John McDowell, is that the operation of conceptual capacities need not be understood as limited to deliberative or discursive thought. In the final analysis, I will argue that McDowell’s alternative proposal, while right in its commitment to the above claim, goes awry in taking the capacity for judgement and the possession of language to be a condition of having concepts.
Published on
November 2, 2010 in
Events.
Title: On Innocence and War
Speaker: Nik Parkin
Date, Time: 03/11/10, 6:15pm
Location: Old Quadrangle Common Room
Abstract: I think it true that if it is morally impermissible to kill innocents, and if innocents are inevitably killed in modern war, then it is morally impermissible to wage modern war. Moreover, I think that it is impermissible to kill innocents, and innocents are inevitably killed in war. This seminar will examine two objections to this argument. The first claims that it is possible to wage modern war without innocents being killed. The second maintains that there is a moral distinction between intentional and foreseen harms, whereby the former are impermissible and the latter permissible (the principle of double-effect).