Published on
May 27, 2011 in
Events.
Title: Sketch for a Merleau-Pontian Ethics
Speaker: Anya Daly
Date, Time: 31/05/11, 5:15pm
Location: Old Quad Common Room
Abstract: Merleau-Ponty has provocatively claimed that resolving ‘the problem of the Other’ (the problem of other minds) would lead to an entire reconstruction of western philosophy. Why would this philosopher – renowned for his humility make such a seemingly grandiose claim? He further claims that all the perplexities, most notably solipsism and scepticism, that have occupied philosophers since Plato, have been founded on an error, an error that reached its apogee with Descartes’ dualism.
Continue reading ‘Philosophy Postgraduate Colloquium – 31/05/11′
Published on
May 24, 2011 in
Events.
Title: Questions Without Answers
Speaker: Damien Rochford (MIT)
Date, Time: 25/05/11, 3:00pm
Location: Old Quad Moot Court.
Abstract: I’m going to argue that the answer to the problem of intentionality (i.e., the
problem of explaining what the deal is with things that are about other things)
has to take a certain form. Roughly speaking, the thesis is that intentional
properties of sub-sentential terms are derivative on the properties of
sentences; it will take a while to make it non-rough.
This matters because, if its right, there’s a sense in which certain questions
— maybe a lot of questions philosophers worry about — don’t have answers. I
will try to sketch how that follows.
Incidentally, this is all basically Quine; my view is just his view minus
behaviourism, and with different emphasis.
Warning: this talk is in the *highly* initial stages. Pro: you’re getting in on
the ground level! You may shape the future of philosophy! Con: the project may
collapse mid-talk.
Published on
May 8, 2011 in
Events.
Title: Induction, Predication and Language
Speaker: Aaron Guthrie
Date, Time: 10/05/11, 5:15pm
Location: Theatrette 1, Arts West Building (Formerly Economics & Commerce Building). Click here for a map.
Abstract: All emeralds so far examined are green. This gives inductive confirmation for all emeralds being green, yet examined or not. But let us define “grue” as “green iff examined before 2020”. All emeralds thus far examined are also grue, so we have confirmation that all emeralds are grue. Something has gone wrong; this doesn’t seem like a plausible confirmation.
A natural way to proceed is to resist “grue” as being a predicate good for induction; e.g. that it is un-natural, and intuitively complex. This isn’t such an easy move to make, as there is logical symmetry between the predicates; in so far as grue is equivalent to “green iff examined before 2020”, green is equivalent to “grue iff examined before 2020”. But there is non-logical asymmetry; you don’t need to check your watch to know if something is green. This can be used to resist “grue” as being on equal footing to “green”. This talk will aim to bolster our understanding of such asymmetries by discussing asymmetries that hold between different languages.
Published on
May 2, 2011 in
Events.
Title: Metaphysical Foundationalism and the Principle of Sufficient Reason
Speaker: Ricki Bliss
Date, Time: 3/05/11, 5:15pm
Location: Theatrette 1, Arts West Building (Formerly Economics & Commerce Building). Click here for a map.
Abstract: Metaphysical foundationalists claim that there must be a fundamental ontological ground. The reasons for which this is thought to be the case are varied. Something like a principle of sufficient reason appears to be in operation in foundationalist arguments in defense of this position. Cosmological arguments to the existence of God also employ a principle of sufficient reason. These arguments move us from the existence of the contingent phenomenal world to that of a necessary being. If the foundationalist employs a principle of sufficient reason to argue to the existence of fundamentalia, are they also arguing to the existence of necessary being(s)? What kind of PSR is the foundationalist employing in these arguments? In this talk, I argue that no matter which version of the PSR is invoked by the foundationalist, metaphysical foundationalism is in serious trouble.