Published on
May 2, 2011 in
Events.
Title: Metaphysical Foundationalism and the Principle of Sufficient Reason
Speaker: Ricki Bliss
Date, Time: 3/05/11, 5:15pm
Location: Theatrette 1, Arts West Building (Formerly Economics & Commerce Building). Click here for a map.
Abstract: Metaphysical foundationalists claim that there must be a fundamental ontological ground. The reasons for which this is thought to be the case are varied. Something like a principle of sufficient reason appears to be in operation in foundationalist arguments in defense of this position. Cosmological arguments to the existence of God also employ a principle of sufficient reason. These arguments move us from the existence of the contingent phenomenal world to that of a necessary being. If the foundationalist employs a principle of sufficient reason to argue to the existence of fundamentalia, are they also arguing to the existence of necessary being(s)? What kind of PSR is the foundationalist employing in these arguments? In this talk, I argue that no matter which version of the PSR is invoked by the foundationalist, metaphysical foundationalism is in serious trouble.
Published on
April 15, 2011 in
Events.
Title: Love, Properties, and Agency
Speaker: Ginger Clausen (University of Arizona)
Date, Time: 19/04/11, 5:15pm
Location: Theatrette 1, Arts West Building (Formerly Economics & Commerce Building). Click here for a map.
Abstract: I will critique two recent accounts of the nature of love and propose an alternative, which incorporates insights from each. The first is advanced by David Velleman in “Love as a Moral Emotion,” and the second by Simon Keller in “How Do I Love Thee? Let Me Count The Properties.” Velleman argues that parties to the best sort of love are appreciated not for their distinguishing characteristics, but for their bare personhood, that quality Kantians like Velleman believe puts us all “beyond price.” Keller defends an alternative account, which he calls “the properties view,” and according to which we are indeed loved for our distinguishing characteristics. He proposes a number of conditions on what kinds of properties appropriately ground the best kind of love, and defends these conditions against Velleman’s objections to the very idea of a properties view. I will argue that there are serious problems with both accounts, and propose a different kind of property view that is not vulnerable to these problems, is plausible in its own right, and allows for a better response to Velleman’s objections than Keller is ultimately able to provide.
Published on
April 10, 2011 in
Events.
Title: Wealth, justice, and practical reason; some lessons from Adam Smith
Speaker: Ben Kearns (University of Arizona)
Date, Time: 12/04/11, 5:15pm
Location: Theatrette 1, Arts West Building (Formerly Economics & Commerce Building). Click here for a map.
Abstract: The motive to acquire wealth plays an uneasy, almost Janus-faced role in Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments. On the one hand, the individual’s motive to wealth acquisition is in practical tension with her compliance with the rules of justice, because those rules radically constrain the ways in which she might acquire wealth. Initially, Smith seems to offer a straightforward resolution to this problem: he argues it is practically irrational for individuals to pursue wealth; or at least wealth in excess of even the most ordinary income. But Smith also claims a near universal motive to accumulate wealth plays a crucial moral role, as it is a necessary condition for securing the material prosperity of any society. I use Smith’s analysis as an avenue to explore the relationship between wealth acquisition, justice, and practical reason. Specifically, I argue that Smith’s analysis casts into doubt the possibility that we might ever realize one of the central projects of modern political philosophy: showing compliance with the rules of justice is consistent with practical reason.
Published on
April 4, 2011 in
Events.
Title: The Bitch that Growls and Snaps at her Master: Plato’s Attack on Poets in The Republic
Speaker: Desma Kearney
Date, Time: 5/04/11, 5:15pm
Location: Theatrette 1, Arts West Building (Formerly Economics & Commerce Building). Click here for a map.
Abstract: It is well known that Plato enacts a particularly harsh judgement on poetry and poets in The Republic, and insists that there is an ancient quarrel with philosophy. I present a reading of The Republic that takes the quarrel with poetry as central to its philosophical purpose by examining the substance of the arguments Plato raises against poetry and his reasons for doing so, and by showing that the quarrel with poetry is not confined to the passages where it is made explicit, but informs the whole dialogue. I contend that the quarrel with poetry is vital to Plato’s aim of establishing philosophy as the discourse of knowledge and the dialectical labour as its method. As such I argue that even given his hesitancy, his minimal preservation of poetry in the ideal state, his allusion to certain conditions under which its re-admittance may be considered, Plato’s attack on poets is uncompromising; their banishment unmitigated, and there is less inconsistency between the substance of the attack and the ways in which it appears to be tempered than is often supposed.
Published on
March 25, 2011 in
Events.
Title: Ontological Dependence in Set Theory
Speaker: John Wigglesworth (CUNY)
Date, Time: 29/03/11, 5:15pm
Location: Theatrette 1, Arts West Building (Formerly Economics & Commerce Building). Click here for a map.
Abstract: Some objects depend on others for their existence. I defend the claim that some mathematical objects depend on others for their existence as well. This ontological dependence is perhaps most clear in the case of sets. There is reason to think that a set depends on its members for its existence.
Articulating this claim, however, is surprisingly difficult. It is natural to endorse a modal analysis of this kind of dependence, using a possible worlds interpretation of modality. I show why a straightforward possible worlds analysis fails to capture dependence relations between sets and their members. It fails primarily because there are not enough possible worlds to do the job.
I supplement the possible worlds analysis with impossible worlds. I then use a counterfactual analysis to give truth conditions for the claim that a set ontologically depends on its members.
Published on
March 17, 2011 in
Events.
Two talks this week.
Talk 1
Title: How to Self-Transform
Speaker: Sam Gates-Scovelle
Date, Time: 22/03/11, 5:15pm
Location: Theatrette 1, Arts West Building (Formerly Economics & Commerce Building). Click here for a map.
Abstract: My thesis investigates whether it’s reasonable to intend to self-transform. What is it to self-transform? It is to become a person who, on the basis of psychological criteria for personal identity, is no longer the selfsame person as you because they are radically psychological discontinuous. But — and that’s a “but” coming from Locke, Shoemaker, Parfit and Lewis, psychological continuity theorists all — radical psychological discontinuity is not possible in a normal life! In this seminar, I clarify their objection(s) and reply to them to show how reasonable self-transformation may just be.
Talk 2
Continue reading ‘Philosophy Postgraduate Colloquium – 22/03/11′
Published on
March 14, 2011 in
Events.
Title: Aristotle, Marx, Buddha – Continuity and Contradiction in the Work of Edward Conze
Speaker: Holger Heine
Date, Time: 15/03/11, 5:15pm
Location: Theatrette 1, Arts West Building (Formerly Economics & Commerce Building). Click here for a map.
Abstract: The Anglo-German philosopher Edward Conze (1904-1979) is perhaps best known as a Buddhist scholar and translator of Prajnaparamita texts. Less well known is that he started his academic career in Germany, studying classical Greek and Scholastic philosophy, that he became a Marxist in the late 1920’s and, furthermore, that he actively participated in the militant Communist resistance to the rising tide of Fascism in Germany. After moving to England in 1933, he continued his work as a Marxist writer and theorist for a number of years. However, at the beginning of WWII, Conze – encouraged by the writings of D.T. Suzuki – turned his focus to Buddhist studies, which he continued to pursue for the rest of his life.
Continue reading ‘Philosophy Postgraduate Colloquium – 15/03/11′
Published on
March 8, 2011 in
Events.
Title: Nietzsche, Wagner, and the Meanders of Romanticism
Speaker: Bogdan Dicher
Date, Time: 8/03/11, 5:15pm
Location: Theatrette 1, Arts West Building (Formerly Economics & Commerce Building). Click here for a map.
Abstract: We take a look at the relation between the two coryphaei of German culture, within the broader picture of German Romanticism. We will attempt to connect both what brought them together and what later divided them with particular developments in the Romantic movement. Finally, we will address the question of whether Nietzsche’s brutal criticism of Wagner can be seen as marking the exhaustion of the expressive resources of Romanticism.
Published on
February 27, 2011 in
Events.
Title: What is Ethic(s)?
Speaker: Bernd Bartl
Date, Time: 1/03/11, 6:15pm
Location: Theatrette 1, Arts West Building (Formerly Economics & Commerce Building). Click here for a map.
Abstract: An exploration of the ‘feel’, ‘quality’ or ‘quale’ of the ethical and moral; or what François Raffoul terms the “ethicality of ethics” (Raffoul, 2010, The origins of responsibility, Indiana UP, p.2). Traced from ancient and classical records. Discussed in the light of the pedagogical triad of nature-teaching/learning-custom.
Published on
January 20, 2011 in
News.
With the new semester comes a new University of Melbourne Philosophy Postgraduate Colloquium Series, provisionally taking place early evening on Tuesdays (5:15-7:15 PM). Naturally, in order for this to occur, speakers are required to volunteer papers to fill in our schedule, roughly 12 weeks over the teaching period (Tuesday the 29th of February being our first available date). Papers ought not to exceed 45 minutes in length, but the content of such presentations is encouraged to be as diverse as possible. If you are interested in presenting, please send Julian Spiller an email (jtspiller[at]gmail.com) indicating an approximate week of preference – no need to have titles or abstracts battened down yet! Postgraduate students at other universities are also encouraged to express their interest.